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NOTES
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS OR INHERENTLY DIFFI-
CULT? INTERPRETATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF
IMPOSING VICARIOUS LIABILITY ON GENERAL CON-
TRACTORS FOR INJURIES SUFFERED AS A RESULT
OF WORK PERFORMED BY INDEPENDENT CONTRAC-
TORS: Hooper v. Pizzagalli Construction Company
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the rule of respondeat superior, a master is liable for
the torts his servants commit in the scope of their employment.'
An exception to this rule exists, however, when the "servant" is
not actually a "servant" in the true sense of the word. Courts gen-
erally classify such a person or organization as an independent
contractor, and will not generally impose vicarious liability on
their employers for injuries arising out of their work.2 This Note
focuses on a major exception to this exception: courts will impose
vicarious liability on employers of independent contractors for
injuries arising from any employment involving inherently dan-
gerous work. This doctrine's importance arises from several desir-
able policy objectives. First, by extending liability to both
independent contractors and their employers, the doctrine estab-
lishes a greater quantity of concern such that necessary safety
precautions will be taken, thus resulting in fewer injuries.3 Sec-
ond, the employers who benefit from inherently dangerous work
should bear some of the responsibility for injuries received by
workers engaged in such work, and by third parties arising from
such work.4 Finally, the employees of independent contractors,
who have been injured while performing inherently dangerous
work, rarely have the financial capacity to handle the entire bur-
1. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958).
2. See generally infra notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text.
3. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 353, 407 S.E.2d 222, 235 (1991).
4. Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n, 841 P.2d 282, 287 (Colo. 1992).
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den of medical expenses and lost income. Although workers' com-
pensation through their primary employers (the independent
contractors) helps them some, equity dictates that the large, well-
endowed general contractors, who ultimately benefit from the
inherently dangerous work, should bear some of the burden.5
Just, what exactly do courts mean when they say, "inherently
dangerous activity"? Since 1876,6 courts in England and the
United States have grappled to find a working definition for the
inherently dangerous exception in ordinary tort actions.7 With its
newly-acquired significance in workers' compensation actions, the
doctrine threatens to stir even more confusion.8 Legal scholars
and commentators concede the doctrine cannot be adequately
defined, 9 and the law pertaining to the area remains hopelessly
murky. One cannot ignore, however, the fact that cases' outcomes
often turn on whether a court classifies a particular activity as
"inherently dangerous." The doctrine pervades not only cases
involving large general contractors such as the defendant in
5. Vogh v. F.C. Geer Co., 171 N.C. 672, 681, 88 S.E. 874, 878 (1916) (Clark,
J., dissenting).
6. Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B. 321 (1876).
7. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965). This rule
provides:
one who employs an independent contractor to do work which the
employer should recognize is likely to create, during its progress, a
peculiar and unreasonable risk of harm to others unless special
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
them by the absence of such precautions if the employer:
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the independent
contractor shall take such precautions, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other
manner for the taking of such precautions.
Id.
See also comments b, c, and f to the above rule: Comment b purports to
clarify the rule, stating that special risks must arise out of the character of the
work to be done, or out of the place where it is done, and the reasonable person
should recognize that special precautions are necessary. The risk created is not a
normal, routine matter of customary human activity, such as driving a car, but
the risk does not have to be abnormally great. Comment c gives examples of
activities which are inherently dangerous as a matter of law, including
demolitions and excavations. Comment f adds that the extent of the employer's
knowledge and experience in the field of work to be done should be taken into
account. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 cmts. b, c, f (1965).
8. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
9. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 71, at 512 -515 (5th ed. 1984).
484 [Vol. 17:483
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Hooper v. Pizzagalli Construction Co.,' ° but also cases involving
homeowners, small businesses, or anyone else who might hire
another person to perform work for them."
The Hooper decision represents the first interpretation of the
inherently dangerous doctrine as the North Carolina Supreme
Court defined it in the now famous workers' compensation case,
Woodson v. Rowland. 2 A quick overview, at this point, of the
Woodson decision is helpful in understanding the ensuing discus-
sion. Woodson involved a subcontractor's employee who was
killed by a trench cave-in. The estate brought actions against
both the general and subcontractors. 13 The court stated the gen-
eral rule that any person or general contractor, who employs an
independent contractor to perform work inherently dangerous in
nature, may not delegate to that independent contractor the duty
to provide for the safety of others.' 4 In remanding the case, the
court held material issues of fact existed regarding whether the
trenching could be considered an inherently dangerous activity for
the purpose of finding the general contractor liable.15 In formulat-
ing a working definition for the phrase "inherently dangerous,"
the court stated an inherently dangerous activity differs from an
"ultrahazardous" activity. An activity classified as "inherently
dangerous" involves risks of harm to others which may be reduced
by taking proper and reasonable safety precautions. That an
activity can be performed safely with the proper procedures does
not alter its inherently dangerous nature, however. 16 Courts
should apply negligence standards to inherently dangerous activi-
ties, because the exercise of reasonable care can control the risks
involved in such activities.'" If, on the other hand, an activity's
safety risks cannot be reduced, regardless of even the most pru-
10. Hooper v. Pizzagalli Constr. Co., 112 N.C. App. 400, 436 S.E.2d 145
(1993), discretionary review denied, 335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
11. See, e.g., Funk v. General Motors Corp., 220 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1974).
12. 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 352-53, 407 S.E.2d at 235. The court stated the policy objectives for
the rule were, first, certain obligations are of such importance that employers
should not be able to escape liability for such duties simply by hiring others to
perform them; and, second, there is a greater likelihood that safety precautions
will be taken if both the general contractor and the subcontractor may be held
liable. Id.
15. Id. at 356, 407 S.E.2d at 238.
16. Id. at 351, 407 S.E.2d at 234.
17. Id.
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dent precautions, such activity qualifies as "ultrahazardous."
Courts should apply strict liability standards to such activities.' 8
The Woodson court outlined inherently dangerous work, gener-
ally, as work to be done from which mischievous consequences will
arise unless proper safety measures are adopted, 9 and work
which involves recognizable and substantial dangers inherent in
it, as distinguished from dangers collaterally created by the
independent negligence of contractors, which latter might take
place on jobs themselves involving no inherent danger.20  The
court further stated that certain activities, such as installing elec-
trical wiring, are considered inherently dangerous as a matter of
law.2 ' Similarly, the court stated certain other activities can
never be considered inherently dangerous as a matter of law.22
The Woodson court stressed that these extremes, however ideal
they seem for the purpose of doctrinal application, denote in real-
ity only a select few cases. Most cases require a court to view a
questioned activity in light of the attendant circumstances in
order to decide whether such activity can be considered inherently
dangerous. 23 Moreover, the court concluded no bright-line rules
apply in determining whether a given activity in a given case
exhibits inherently dangerous characteristics sufficient to satisfy
the exception. 24 The ruling provides some useful guidelines, how-
ever, in cautioning lawyers and courts concerning ultrahazardous
activities, or with activities which are safe unless performed negli-
18. Id. at 350-51, 407 S.E.2d at 234. The rationale behind applying strict
liability to such activities is they should "pay their own way." Id. (quoting
CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 20.40,
at 355 (1991)).
19. Id. at 352, 407 S.E.2d at 235 (citing Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190
N.C. 632, 637, 130 S.E. 739, 743 (1925)).
20. Id. at 351, 407 S.E.2d at 235 (citing Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C 253, 258-59,
17 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1941)).
21. Id. at 353, 407 S.E.2d at 236 (citing Peters v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen
Mills, Inc., 199 N.C 753, 155 S.E. 867 (1930)). Examples of proper safety
precautions include making sure no power is running to the wires, making sure
the wiring has proper insulation, and making sure conduits contain no defects.
22. Id. The court cites earlier cases which define certain activities which are
not considered inherently dangerous as a matter of law, including Brown v.
Texas Co., 237 N.C. 738, 76 S.E.2d 45 (1953) (sign erection is not inherently
dangerous), and Vogh v. F.C. Geer Co., 171 N.C. 672, 88 S.E. 874 (1916) (general
building construction is not inherently dangerous).
23. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 353, 407 S.E.2d at 236.
24. Id. at 353, 407 S.E.2d at 235.
486 [Vol. 17:483
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gently.25 Once a court determines an activity to be inherently
dangerous, Woodson directs that court to consider whether the
employer took reasonable steps to ensure the safety of independ-
ent contractors, their employees, and third parties.2 6 Obviously,
this process is much more easily described than accomplished.
After the North Carolina Supreme Court formulated a work-
ing definition for the hard-to-apply doctrine in Woodson v. Row-
land, the North Carolina Court of Appeals "tested the proverbial
waters" when it applied parts of the Woodson test to another
workers' compensation case, Hooper v. Pizzagalli Construction
Co. 27 The Hooper court concluded the fatal accident in which an
employee of a subcontractor was involved did not arise from inher-
ently dangerous work, and affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment against the decedent's estate and in favor of the general
contractor involved in the case.28 The North Carolina Supreme
Court subsequently denied review.29
This Note has several objectives. First, it outlines how the
Hooper court used parts of the Woodson interpretation to conclude
that the work in which the plaintiff's decedent was involved did
not fall within the inherently dangerous exception. Next, it traces
the origins of the doctrine itself, and how it has evolved in other
jurisdictions as well as in North Carolina. The Note analyzes
some criticisms of the doctrine, predicting what may become of it
in the future.
Additionally, this Note analyzes the Hooper court's decision
by comparing it to the Woodson analysis, as well as to the defini-
tions and trends of other jurisdictions, in order to determine
whether the Hooper decision was the correct one. Finally, this
Note outlines possible future trends in North Carolina tort law in
the wake of this decision.
25. Id. at 350, 407 S.E.2d at 234. The court enumerated blasting as the only
activity North Carolina courts consider to be truly ultrahazardous. Id. at 351,
407 S.E.2d at 234.
26. Id. at 351, 407 S.E.2d at 235.
27. See Hooper v. Pizzagalli Constr. Co., 112 N.C. App. 400, 436 S.E.2d 145
(1993), discretionary review denied, 335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
28. Id. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149.
29. Hooper v. Pizzagalli Constr. Co., 335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
Thus, the Supreme Court denied review of a case in which the court used the
high court's interpretation, but arrived at an opposite result, finding no
inherently dangerous activity, whereas in Woodson, the court found evidence
tending to indicate the trenching at issue was inherently dangerous.
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II. THE CASE
In Hooper, the estate of a deceased worker sued three defend-
ants for wrongful death under a workers' compensation claim.
Defendant Pizzagalli Construction Company, the general contrac-
tor in charge of constructing a Durham building at least seven sto-
ries tall, had hired defendant Acme Plumbing and Heating,
Incorporated, as the subcontractor in charge of plumbing the
building. Decedent, Timothy Hooper, worked for Acme. 30 On July
6, 1988, the decedent stood on an unsecured scaffold board, which
was placed by unknown persons on the scaffold, to perform some
plumbing work thirteen feet above the concrete slab on which the
building was erected. 31 The contract between Acme and Pizzagalli
did not specify the use of scaffolding during the work.32 The scaf-
fold board had no guard rails, and the decedent took no other
measures to secure himself.33 Upon completion of the work, the
decedent attempted to step from the scaffold to a catwalk.34 At
that time, the scaffold board slid out from under him, and he
plummeted thirteen feet to the concrete. 35 He died in the hospital
of severe head injuries two days later.3 6
On July 3, 1990, the decedent's estate instituted this action
for the wrongful death of the decedent.37 The trial court granted
defendant Pizzagalli's summary judgment motion on September
26, 1991.38
The estate appealed the trial court's ruling, contending the
general contractor had breached a non-delegable duty to the dece-
dent, and that the breach had proximately caused the decedent's
death.39 The estate claimed the plumbing work performed in con-
junction with the use of a scaffold qualified as inherently danger-
ous work.40
30. Hooper, 112 N.C. App. at 402, 436 S.E.2d at 147. The estate also sued
West Durham Mechanical, Inc., which does not concern the issue explored by
this Note. Id. at 401, 436 S.E.2d at 147.
31. Id. at 402-03, 436 S.E.2d at 147.
32. Id. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149.
33. Id. at 403, 436 S.E.2d at 147.
34. Id. at 403, 436 S.E.2d at 148.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 402, 436 S.E.2d at 147.
39. Id. at 403, 436 S.E.2d at 148.
40. Id. at 405, 436 S.E.2d at 149. The estate also contended Pizzagalli
maintained sufficient control over the manner and method of Acme's work to hold
488 [Vol. 17:483
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In quoting Woodson v. Rowland, the Hooper court defined
"inherently dangerous activity" as any activity from which "mis-
chievous consequences" will result without proper safety precau-
tions, which has a "recognizable and substantial danger inherent
in the work, as distinguished from a danger collaterally created by
the independent negligence of the contractor, which latter might
take place on a job itself involving no inherent danger."41 In
applying this part of the Woodson interpretation to the facts of
Hooper, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no inherently
dangerous activity, and thus affirmed the trial court.42 The court
of appeals based its decision on the fact that use of the scaffold to
complete the plumbing work was not mentioned in the contract
between Acme and Pizzagalli, and therefore, the court found the
decedent's choice to use the scaffold was totally collateral to the
work contracted.4 3 The court of appeals also stated plumbing does
not constitute an inherently dangerous activity, a proposition sup-
ported in other jurisdictions.44 Additionally, the court noted that
since the decedent did not properly secure the scaffold board, or
take any other precautions, he created the danger through his
own independent wrongful act.45 The court thus held the "danger"
a totally collateral one, which did not in any way inhere to the
work.46 Thus, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in its first
interpretation of the Woodson definition, quickly concluded the
decedent's work was not sufficiently dangerous to impose vicari-
ous liability on the general contractor. 47
the general contractor liable. Id. at 404, 436 S.E.2d at 148. The court rejected
this argument. Id. at 405, 436 S.E.2d at 149.
41. Id. at 405, 436 S.E.2d at 149 (quoting Woodson, 329 N.C. at 351, 407
S.E.2d at 234).
42. Id. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Goolsby v. Kenney, 545 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)).
45. Id.
46. Id. In North Carolina, collateral negligence completely bars a plaintiff
from recovery because North Carolina still honors the doctrine of contributory
negligence. See generally infra note 176 and accompanying text.
47. Hooper, 112 N.C. App. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149-50.
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Doctrine in Other Jurisdictions:
Confusion Abounds
The inherently dangerous exception to non-liability for torts
arising from work performed by independent contractors has been
recognized at English common law since 1876.48 Bower v. Peate
defined inherently dangerous activity as activity during which "if,
in the course of the work, injurious consequences might be
expected to result unless means are taken to prevent them."4 9
Even now, one hundred eighteen years after its inception, the
doctrine remains hopelessly vague. Some American jurisdictions
have become confused with the differences between "inherently
dangerous" activities, and "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally dan-
gerous" activities. 50 "Inherently dangerous" activity, however,
denotes something separate and distinct from "abnormally dan-
gerous" or "ultrahazardous" activity.5 1 One Michigan case, Funk
48. Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B. 321 (1876).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 139 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 1956)
(holding inherently dangerous instrumentalities are those things imminently
dangerous in kind, such as explosives and poisonous drugs); Funk v. General
Motors Corp., 220 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1974) (applying a strict liability standard
to inherently dangerous activities). For further insight on the confusion over the
standard to be applied to inherently dangerous activities in other jurisdictions,
see Negligence-Liability for Transmission of HIV, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 29,
1993, at 11A (stating courts apply strict liability to "inherently dangerous
activities"); Strict Tort Liability, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1993, at L3 (stating
strict liability may be imposed on inherently dangerous or ultrahazardous
activities); Henry Sokolski, Adjusting to North Korea's Reality, NEWSDAY, Apr. 8,
1993, at 103 (stating inherently dangerous activities "cannot be safeguarded,"
thus implying a strict liability standard). For more examples of courts' general
ignorance of the difference between "inherently dangerous activities" and
"ultrahazardous activities," see Hauling Steel Not Inherently Dangerous, AM.
MACHINIST, Aug., 1993, at 38; Laurie A. Rich, Bhopal Lawsuit Begins in India,
CHEMICAL WK., Sept. 17, 1986, at 15 (both citing courts equating "inherently
dangerous" activities with "ultrahazardous" activities).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 cmt. b (1965), which clearly
points out that if an activity qualifies as "inherently" or "intrinsically" dangerous,
it does not mean the activity cannot be done without risk to others. Such
activities do not have to involve a particularly high degree of risk, or the
possibility of very serious harm. All that is required is a risk recognizable in
advance, such that precautions may be taken to eliminate the risk. Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965), which clearly defines an
"abnormally dangerous activity" as one which involves a very high degree of risk,
which will likely result in great harm, and which cannot be eliminated with even
490 [Vol. 17:483
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v. General Motors Corp. ,52 exemplifies this confusion, applying a
seemingly correct approach to the doctrine, but then attaching to
it a strict liability standard. 53 This causes a paradoxical effect in
the court's interpretation, since the "due diligence" required to
reduce risks associated with inherently dangerous activities nec-
essarily implies a negligence standard.54 Other examples of
inconsistencies include cases where courts intermix correct inter-
pretations with incorrect ones, holding that inherently dangerous
work may be carried on safely with the correct precautions, but
otherwise involves "grave risks of serious harm."55 This construc-
tion exemplifies confusion, however, since activities classified as
inherently dangerous need not involve great risk and the possible
harm need not be severe.56
Other jurisdictions have taken pains to define the doctrine as
narrowly as they can, in order to avoid inconsistencies and to
make its application more practical for courts, attorneys, employ-
ers and independent contractors. 57 The vagueness inherent in the
the utmost amount of care. Comment f to section 520 asserts the essential
question to ask is whether the activity justifies the imposition of strict liability.
Comment g states the use of atomic energy exemplifies an abnormally dangerous
activity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmts. f, g (1965).
52. 220 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1974).
53. See id. In dissenting in Funk, Judge Coleman applied a detailed
Woodson-like approach to the problem at issue. Id. at 652. He quoted 41 AM.
JuR. 2D Independent Contractors § 41 (1969), which states that the liability of an
employer depends on antecedent knowledge of the danger inherent in the work
or a finding that the average, prudent employer should, in the exercise of due
diligence, have known. Funk, 220 N.W.2d at 658. Judge Coleman also cited
section 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as reflective of the difficulty
inherent in defining the term. Id. The Restatement states that an inherently
dangerous activity is one which is dangerous in the absence of special
precautions; one whose danger an employer should anticipate prior to making a
contract. Id. The court, however, turned about-face and applied a strict liability
standard.
54. Funk, 220 N.W.2d at 658.
55. Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op, 599 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Ark. Ct. App.),
aff'd, 606 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1980).
56. See generally supra note 51 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Manley, 265 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Ark. 1954). The court
cited Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.), in determining the definition of
"imminent": near at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than
touching; impending; at the point of happening; threatening; perilous. Id. The
court also stated there "must be knowledge of danger, not merely possible but
probable." Id. See also Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co., Inc., 155
N.E.2d 333, 335 (Ill. Ct. App. 1958), aff'd, 163 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. 1959). This court
defined "inherently dangerous" as "that type of danger which inheres in the
9
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doctrine, however, causes the definitions to become long and con-
voluted, thus complicating their application. Still other states
have posited relatively simple definitions which contain no incon-
sistencies.5 s These interpretations prove just as problematic as
those containing inconsistencies, though, because they provide
few, if any, guidelines for courts and attorneys to follow.
An exception to the typically problematic approach to the doc-
trine was handed down in a recent Colorado Supreme Court case,
Huddleston v. Union Rural Electric Ass'n. 59 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Huddleston court provided a detailed, yet consistent
guideline for applying the inherently dangerous doctrine in dis-
cerning general contractor liability for injuries arising from the
work of independent contractors.6 0 The court defined an inher-
ently dangerous activity as one presenting
a special or peculiar danger to others that is inherent in the
nature of the activity or the circumstances under which it is to be
performed, that is different in kind from the ordinary risks that
commonly confront persons in the community, and that the
employer knows or should know is inherent in the nature of the
activity or in the particular circumstances under which the activ-
ity is to be performed.6 1
This interpretation explicitly adds a foreseeability element, thus
making clear the proper application of a negligence standard. The
interpretation also makes clear that often an activity's inherently
dangerous character turns on the circumstances under which it is
performed. 2
instrumentality or condition itself at all times, thereby requiring special
precautions to be taken with regard to it to prevent injury.. ." Id. It "does not
mean danger which arises from mere casual or collateral negligence of others
with respect to [the instrumentality] under particular circumstances." Id.
58. See, e.g., Hand v. Harrison, 108 S.E.2d 814, 816 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959)
(stating an inherently dangerous activity is one with which a little more than
ordinary care, but not extraordinary care, is necessary in dealing with such
activity). See also Begley v. Adaber Realty & Inv. Co., 358 S.W.2d 785, 791 (Mo.
1962) (holding the inherently dangerous rule applies only to latent defects known
by the general contractor which the independent contractor could not discern
with reasonably careful inspection); Downs v. A & H Constr., Ltd., 481 N.W.2d
520, 526 (Iowa 1992) (spelling out simply that an inherently dangerous activity
yells "danger!").
59. 841 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1992).
60. See id.
61. Id. at 290.
62. See generally infra text accompanying note 180 for further discussion of
Colorado's elemental approach.
492 [Vol. 17:483
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A few jurisdictions have replaced the "inherently dangerous"
doctrine with a "peculiar risk" doctrine.6 3 Courts in these jurisdic-
tions hold an employer of an independent contractor liable for
even the independent contractor's own negligence, in cases where
the work involves certain "peculiar risks."64 The employer has a
right to indemnity, however, where the independent contractor
has in fact been found negligent. 65
Some jurisdictions address the collateral negligence issue on
which the Hooper court so heavily relied.66 For instance, Illinois
courts have held that any negligent manner in which workers per-
form alleged inherently dangerous activities negates the inher-
ently dangerous character of the activities.6 7 In other words,
those who employ independent contractors cannot be held liable
for injuries sustained because such independent contractors have
negligently failed to take proper precautions.
Many courts apply the doctrine to non-traditional contexts,
such as medical procedures and recreational activities. The gen-
eral consensus seems to hold that medical procedures, even those
which involve life and death, cannot be considered inherently dan-
gerous for the purpose of holding employers (such as hospitals and
insurance companies) liable for the negligence of independent con-
tractors (doctors, nurses, dentists, etc.). 68 In the recreational con-
63. See, e.g., Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721, 725 (Cal. 1993).
64. Id. The risks involved are analogous to those normally mentioned in
inherently dangerous work (injury is likely to result of proper precautions are not
taken).
65. Id. For insights on examples of particular activities considered inherently
dangerous both within and without the realm of the legal profession, see Carolan
E. Malia, Drug Testing in Regulated Industries: Public Interest Versus Employee
Privacy, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 27, 1989, at 50 (stating transportation of natural
gas is an inherently dangerous activity); Robert H. Peters, Management and
Mine Safety, ENGINEERING AND MINING J., Aug. 1989, at 22M (mining is
inherently dangerous); Kim Murphy, A-Test Victims Can't Sue, U.S. Court
Decides, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1987, at Al (nuclear weapons testing is a known
inherently dangerous activity); Marcida Dodson & Andy Rose, Crashes Fuel
Debate on Copter Flights, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1987, at B1 (flying helicopters is
inherently dangerous); Labor Law Suit is Upheld, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 29, 1994, at 25
(asbestos removal is inherently dangerous); Strict Liability Claim Goes Forward
in Stabbing Case, CoNN. L. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1993, at 6 (selling cocaine is an
inherently dangerous activity).
66. See generally infra note 138 and accompanying text.
67. David Bailey, Judge Cuts City Negligence Counts in Flood Suit, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 11, 1992, at 1.
68. See Neil A. Goldberg et al., Higher Stakes for Parties to All Insurance
Contracts: Pressures Increase as Focus Expands Beyond Primary Insurer,
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text, litigation continues to surround high-risk sports concerning
whether such sports are sufficiently dangerous to hold the employ-
ers of the independent contractors who administer them6 9 vicari-
ously liable.7 ° Since participants in recreational activities have
more choice in whether they wish to participate (as opposed to
employees whose supervisors often mandate certain activities),
courts more easily tend to find assumption of the risk or some-
thing closely akin thereto.71 Even in the age of safe sex and HIV
awareness, courts generally find sexual activity lacks inherently
dangerous characteristics.7 2
Even scholars seem to confuse the doctrine, including within
their definitions of "inherently dangerous" activities those activi-
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at S-10 (stating that administering stress EKG's to people
with serious heart disease is not inherently dangerous); Medical No-Fault
System is Not the Answer-Make Them Stand Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May, 17, 1990,
at A28 (expressing a viewpoint that medical care and treatment, unlike driving
an automobile, is not inherently dangerous in the sense that a no-fault insurance
scheme should be applied).
69. Rafting guides, ski instructors, hiking guides, etc. often work as
independent contractors for larger operations.
70. For various examples of recreational activities which may become subject
to litigation over the inherent danger issue, see Negligence, Reckless Disregard
and Parasailing, TEx. LAW., Mar. 22, 1993, at 13 (describing a case holding mere
negligence on the independent contractor's part can never support a plaintiff's
recovery for injuries received while engaged in an inherently dangerous sport,
such as parasailing); Drew Corsello, Rafting Tragedy Tied to Employer, AM.
LAW., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 106 (discussing a case holding rafting to be an
inherently dangerous sport, and arguing that companies who run rafting
operations should be held vicariously liable for injuries received by their patrons
on rafting expeditions); John Hanc, Training for In-Line Skating, NEWSDAY, July
30, 1994, at B7 (stating that without the proper precautions and equipment, in-
line skating is likely to result in injury; implying that such a sport qualifies as
inherently dangerous in that without the proper precautions, mischievous
consequences may result); Richard Tapscott, Delegates Move Against Bungee
Jumping, WASH. PosT, Mar. 24, 1993, at C3 (discussing opposition to bungee
jumping as an "inherently dangerous activity"). Bungee jumping arguably
qualifies as ultrahazardous, however, because the harm risked in performing
such an activity is always severe (usually death).
71. Since assumption of the risk applies only to strict-liability activities, one
cannot "assume the risk" when participating in inherently dangerous activities,
to which courts apply a negligence standard. When dealing with recreational
activities defined as inherently dangerous, however, courts still tend not to allow
vicarious liability.
72. Liability for Transmission of HIV, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 30, 1993, at
2B. This example is for illustrative purposes only; this activity usually involves
no employer/independent contractor relationship.
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ties having "ultrahazardous" characteristics. One commentator
has defined the doctrine to include activities dangerous unless
proper precautions are taken, as well as those that are dangerous
without such precautions.73 Comments like these, whether made
carelessly or in honest belief that the doctrine should be inter-
preted in such a manner, serve only to confuse its application even
more, further frustrating courts, attorneys, and anyone else who
might benefit from a clear understanding of exactly what the doc-
trine encompasses.
B. Development of the Doctrine in North Carolina
In North Carolina, a court may determine as a matter of law
whether a given activity is sufficiently dangerous to impose vicari-
ous liability on employers of general contractors." In 1916, the
North Carolina Supreme Court determined that building con-
struction, even though it often results in physical injury, cannot
be considered inherently dangerous as matter of law.75 The state
courts agree that certain activities are truly inherently dangerous
as a matter of law.
76
Since the inherently dangerous doctrine pertains only to
inherently dangerous work performed by independent contractors,
North Carolina courts have endeavored to clarify what, exactly,
constitutes an independent contractor. One early North Carolina
case, Greer v. Callahan Construction Co.,77 defined the term as
one who exercises an independent employment, doing work
according to his own judgment without being subject to the
employer except as to the results of his work; he has the right to
employ and direct workers and is free from any superior authority
73. James B. McHugh, Comment, Risk Administration in the Marketplace: A
Reappraisal of the Independent Contractor Rule, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1973).
74. Deitz v. Jackson, 57 N.C. App. 275, 280, 291 S.E.2d 282, 286 (1982).
75. See Vogh v. F.C. Geer Co., 171 N.C. 672, 88 S.E. 874 (1916) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
76. See Peters v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills, Inc., 199 N.C. 753, 155 S.E.
867 (1930) (holding installing electrical wiring qualifies as an activity inherently
dangerous as a matter of law). See also Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C.
632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925) (holding blasting as inherently dangerous as a matter of
law). But cf Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Brothers Co., 260 N.C. 69, 131
S.E.2d 900 (1963) (adopting the strict liability standard for blasting and labelling
it as the only "truly" ultrahazardous activity recognized by North Carolina
courts).
77. 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925).
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of the employer regarding how the work is to be done.78 The Greer
court held the law does not hold an employer to be an insurer of
safety, stating a general rule that an employer could not be held
liable for an independent contractor's negligence. 79 In determin-
ing what constitutes inherently dangerous work, the court
described a difference between work, which when properly done,
generally produces no injuries, and work from which mischievous
consequences will arise, if proper safety precautions are not
taken.8 0 The court stated liability often turns on foreseeability,
holding that where a general contractor knows or should know of
the inherently dangerous nature of the work, it may be held vicar-
iously liable for injuries suffered by subcontractors' employees. 1
In another early North Carolina case, Evans v. Elliott, the
state high court conceded it could not draw a bright-line rule
between inherently dangerous work and work considered safe
unless performed negligently. 2 The Evans court stressed that
other courts should never equate activities considered "inherently
dangerous" with those considered "ultrahazardous."83 The court
held it well-settled law in North Carolina that if an employer
orders an independent contractor to perform work from which "in
the natural course of things, injurious consequences must be
78. Id. at 635, 130 S.E. at 742. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 409 cmt. a (1965) (defining independent contractor as any person who does
work for another under conditions not sufficient to make him a servant of that
other); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958) (defining an independent
contractor as a person who contracts with another to do something for him but
who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with
respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking). For
another perspective on the independent contractor concept, see Premises
Liability-Open and Obvious Danger, MICH. LAW. WKLY., May 9, 1994, at 20
(explaining a Michigan case which held that a situation in which one neighbor
helps another, even where that neighbor receives a benefit, cannot be considered
an independent contractor relationship).
79. Greer, 190 N.C. at 635, 130 S.E. at 742. This is known as collateral
negligence, which often serves as an effective defense for general contractors in
these cases. For more information on the collateral negligence doctrine, see
generally infra notes 138 and 183 and accompanying text.
80. Greer, 190 N.C. at 637, 130 S.E. at 742.
81. Id. See also Dockery v. World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 142
S.E.2d 29 (1965) (holding that, although a general contractor cannot become an
insurer of safety, it bears the continuing responsibility of ensuring that adequate
safety precautions are taken by subcontractors' employees).
82. Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941).
83. Id.
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expected to arise, unless [proper precautions].. .are taken,"84 then
that employer cannot escape liability.8 5 The Evans court also
stated, when determining whether an activity qualifies as inher-
ently dangerous within the purview of the exception to the general
rule of non-liability, courts must view the activity in light of the
circumstances attendant to each case. 8 6 Thus, courts must dis-
cern, on a case-by-case basis, whether the conditions under which
work was performed warrant labelling such work as "inherently
dangerous."8 7
In many recent North Carolina cases, the courts have hesi-
tated to find questioned activities inherently dangerous. For
example, in McCollum v. Grove Manufacturing Co."8, the court
held a crane not to be an inherently dangerous instrumentality8 9
Similarly, in Olympic Products Co. v. Roof Systems, Inc.,90 the
court held that re-roofing a building could not be considered inher-
ently dangerous such that it falls within the exception to non-lia-
bility.9 ' Before the Woodson decision, the general trend in the
State favors narrowing the doctrine's application. Perhaps the
courts are afraid of allowing too many favorable applications of
the doctrine, especially in light of Woodson.92 Favorable rulings
would encourage plaintiffs to litigate, and allowing too much liti-
gation over the issue in workers' compensation cases might
84. Id. at 258, 17 S.E.2d at 128.
85. Id. at 259, 17 S.E.2d at 129. The court mentioned some very early cases
upholding this principle: Thomas v. Hammer Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 351, 69 S.E.
275 (1910); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Madden, 93 P. 586 (Kan. 1908); Cameron
Mills & Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 81 S.W. 282 (Tex. 1904).
86. Evans, 220 N.C. at 260, 17 S.E.2d at 129.
87. Id. For example, a trench dug in a heavily populated city might be
considered inherently dangerous, whereas that same trench dug on a rural farm
might not. For another doctrinal interpretation from an earlier decision, see Cole
v. Durham, 176 N.C. 289, 97 S.E. 33 (1918) (holding that where the work itself is
dangerous and care must be taken to render it harmless, it can be considered
inherently dangerous; although collateral negligence of the independent
contractor can excuse the general contractor from vicarious liability, such
negligence is no excuse if the general contractor could have reasonably foreseen
it).
88. 58 N.C. App. 283, 293 S.E.2d 632 (1982), aff'd, 307 N.C. 695, 300 S.E.2d
374 (1983).
89. Id.
90. 88 N.C. App. 315, 363 S.W.2d 367, discretionary review denied, 321 N.C.
744, 366 S.E.2d 862 (1988).
91. Id. at 334, 363 S.E.2d at 378.
92. The Woodson court made clear the doctrine applies in the workers'
compensation context, opening the potential for a flood of litigation.
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encourage "hyperlexis."93 Moreover, the inherently dangerous
doctrine is not only tough to apply and litigate, but also very tough
to decide, given the typical scenario where the activity in question
is not inherently dangerous as a matter of law and the case is sent
to a jury. The issues involved are often very technical, involving
areas of expertise with which very few potential jurors have any
experience or knowledge. Coupled with the inherent vagueness in
the doctrine itself,94 its application presents very real problems to
juries as well as judges. Thus, North Carolina courts may want to
discourage unnecessary claims by finding activities to be inher-
ently dangerous in only a small percentage of the cases they hear.
Another possible reason for this trend toward a narrower defini-
tion lies in the discussion on criticisms below. Perhaps the courts
fear a movement toward abolishing the doctrine altogether. Thus,
they may attempt to narrow its parameters as far as is practicable
in hope that such action will provide easier application and less
frustration. 95
North Carolina courts realize in order to effectively utilize the
inherently dangerous exception to non-liability for work per-
formed by independent contractors, they must define the doctrine
narrowly in order for it to be applicable to the particular facts of
each case.9 6 Presently, Woodson v. Rowland dictates the law in
North Carolina: An inherently dangerous activity is one from
which mischievous consequences will arise without proper precau-
tions; it involves a recognizable and substantial danger inherent
in it, as distinguished from a danger collaterally created by the
93. This term of art has been used by critics of the American legal system to
refer to the extreme litigiousness which has developed in society of late. These
critics argue hyperlexis is a major culprit behind the extra-heavy burden on
today's court system.
94. The exception imposing vicarious liability on general contractors for
injuries arising from inherently dangerous activities has confused the legal
community for over a century; obviously, the doctrine is no less confusing to the
laypeople who usually comprise a jury.
95. See generally infra text accompanying note 99 for more discussion on
criticisms of the doctrine itself, as well as arguments for its abolition.
96. See, e.g., Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co., 114 N.C. App. 196, 202, 442
S.E.2d 53, 56 (1994) (holding that where an independent contractor is employed
to perform an inherently dangerous activity, and the hiring person or company
knows or should know of the dangerous circumstances, that person or company
has the nondelegable duty to the independent contractor's employees to exercise
due care to see that they are provided a safe place to work where proper
precautions have been taken against any dangers that might be incident to such
work).
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independent negligence of the independent contractor, which lat-
ter might take place on a job itself involving no inherent danger.9 7
This "official" definition as it now stands emphasizes the collateral
negligence exception to the finding of an inherently dangerous
activity. Although it seems complete on its face, it ignores some
important considerations, such as the foreseeability element. The
Woodson court alluded to other important factors in its opinion,
but it did not include them in its final definition. 98 The omission
may serve only to mislead courts trying to follow the decision,
causing them to arrive at incorrect conclusions.
C. Criticisms of the Inherently Dangerous Doctrine: Possible
Abolition?
Chief Justice Rovira's dissenting opinion in Huddleston v.
Union Rural Electric Ass'n,99 which criticizes the doctrine as
impractical to apply and "unnecessary, as clearer and more pre-
dictable theories [ ] are available. . .," clearly exemplifies the frus-
tration shared by most courts over the doctrine's vagueness. 100
The dissent further asserts the doctrine fails to achieve its pur-
pose, and the costs it imposes far outweigh its benefits. 101 The
argument reflects many of the problems inherent in the doctrine,
and may well predict a national trend toward abolishing the doc-
trine for something more functional. Given that the Huddleston
opinion was delivered recently,'0 2 a discussion of Justice Rovira's
concerns is warranted in light that courts are obviously frustrated
with the doctrine and may become so frustrated that they will
choose to abrogate it altogether.
Justice Rovira's primary concern centers around a belief that
the doctrine fails to accomplish its intended policy goals.'0 3 Appli-
cation of the inherently dangerous exception fails to ensure any
extra safety precautions will be taken during inherently danger-
ous activities, because the doctrine imposes no new obligations on
97. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
98. Id. at 351, 407 S.E.2d at 235. The court cites several definitions used in
previous North Carolina cases, apparently presuming to incorporate them into
its own interpretation.
99. 841 P.2d 282, 295 (Colo. 1992) (Rovira, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 295.
101. Id.
102. Decided November 23, 1992.
103. Huddleston, 841 P.2d at 295-96.
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the employer.10 4 Second, the dissenting opinion expresses concern
about the impracticalities imposed by the doctrine. Not only does
the exception apply to large corporations and general contractors,
it necessarily applies also to sole proprietors or even homeown-
ers-those whose lack of expertise form the basis of their reason
to hire an independent contractor in the first place. Given that
these individuals are often not financially equipped to bear the
burden of vicarious liability, imposing such liability on them
would be manifestly unfair.10 5 Third, Justice Rovira turns to
some well-founded concerns about the doctrine's patent ambigu-
ity, which has led to numerous contradictory decisions, and ren-
dered the doctrine virtually useless in providing any guidelines to
courts and attorneys, and also to employers of independent con-
tractors regarding their possible liabilities. 10 6 Finally, the dissent
asserts that the costs of imposing such a doctrine far outweigh any
benefits gained through its imposition. Even the most prudent
employer must insure against the possible negligence of independ-
ent contractors, and the cost of this insurance is passed to con-
sumers. 10 7 The criticism further states the ambiguity of the
doctrine only exacerbates the insurance problem, because many
cautious employers (not knowing which activities qualify as
"inherently dangerous") may buy unnecessary insurance because
they fear being held vicariously liable for activities which may or
may not actually qualify as inherently dangerous.'0°
Other authorities have heavily criticized the doctrine. 0 9
They illustrate the common concern that "irrational categories
develop" when courts try to distinguish inherently dangerous
activities from those activities that are dangerous unless per-
formed negligently, and when courts attempt to distinguish inher-
ently dangerous activities from "ultrahazardous" activities,
104. Id. Justice Rovira argues the doctrine provides the employer with no new
incentive "to more carefully select, instruct, or provide for the independent
contractor." Id. at 296. Furthermore, imposing vicarious liability on the general
contractor will in no way create incentive for the independent contractor to
perform his work with more care. Id. In fact, the doctrine may work to the
unfair advantage of the independent contractor, especially if a court imposes
vicarious liability on a general contractor for failure to foresee the independent
contractor's negligence.
105. Id. at 296-97.
106. Id. at 297-98.
107. Id. at 298.
108. Id.
109. See generally McHugh, supra note 73.
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thereby resulting in inconsistencies. 110 Authorities cite several
examples of cases in which blatantly inconsistent results have
been reached, some of which arise in the same jurisdiction.1 1' One
North Carolina court held steam sawmills to be inherently dan-
gerous, while a Georgia court disagreed, holding steam sawmills
not to be inherently dangerous." 2 North Carolina courts rou-
tinely hold excavations to be inherently dangerous, while Texas
courts disagree."' Other examples include a West Virginia case
which held building a dam to be inherently dangerous, compared
to a North Carolina case which held building a bridge not to fall
within the purview of the doctrine." 4 James McHugh expresses
some of the same policy concerns surrounding the doctrine as does
Chief Justice Rovira above. For example, McHugh suggests the
doctrine does not achieve its means, stating that neither employ-
ers nor independent contractors are, by virtue of their status as
such, better risk averters." 5 Furthermore, the doctrine does not
110. Id. at 664. McHugh discusses the further complications caused by the
collateral negligence factor, which operates as a defense if an independent
contractor is negligent in an operative detail so detached from the work
contracted that it absolves the employer of vicarious liability. Id. at 664 n.24.
Where must courts draw the line? For cases demonstrating inconsistencies
surrounding the collateral negligence doctrine, see id. at 664 n.24 (comparing
Hyman v. Barrett, 121 N.E. 271 (N.Y. 1918) (holding a board falling from a
window not to be collaterally negligent) with Philadelphia, B. & W.R. Co. v.
Mitchell, 69 A. 422 (Md. 1908) (holding a hammer falling from a bridge to be
collaterally negligent)).
111. Id. at 665 nn.25-26. See, e.g., Baker v. Knight, 205 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947) (holding fumigating is inherently dangerous); Crow v. McAdoo, 219
S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (holding disinfecting railroad cars with creosote is
not inherently dangerous). See also Bill Kisliuk, Will Legal Strategy Hit Target?,
LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 4 (explaining a California case where the court
held the manufacture and distribution of guns not to be considered inherently
dangerous activities); Dan Feldman, Gunning for Gun-Makers, NEWSDAY, Apr.
27, 1992, at 38 (describing a Maryland case which held the manufacture and
distribution of assault weapons to be inherently dangerous activities).
112. McHugh, supra note 73, at 665. See Royal v. Pope & Parish, 177 N.C. 206,
98 S.E. 599 (1919); Lovelace v. Ivey, 152 S.E. 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930).
113. McHugh, supra note 73, at 665 n.26. See Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253,
17 S.E.2d 125 (1941); Dixon v. Robinson, 276 S.W. 770 (Tex. 1925).
114. McHugh, supra note 73, at 665 n.26. See Trump v. Bluefield Waterworks
& Improvement Co., 129 S.E. 309 (W. Va. 1925); Gadsen v. Craft & Co., 173 N.C.
418, 92 S.E. 174 (1917).
115. McHugh, supra note 73, at 665.
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necessarily effect a more careful choice by employers to hire com-
petent independent contractors. 1 1
6
Few solutions exist which could remedy some of the policy
concerns surrounding the doctrine. But some of its pervasive
inconsistencies could be reduced by defining the doctrine's param-
eters specifically, perhaps through legislation, such that it
becomes not only more practicable, but also more uniform
throughout jurisdictions and the nation. If such inconsistencies
persist, the doctrine itself may fall into demise simply because
courts, lawyers, and others encounter divers frustrations when
trying to apply it.
However problematic the inherently dangerous exception to
non-liability for the work of independent contractors may remain,
it still effectively serves important policy goals in situations where
large numbers of subcontractors' employees perform dangerous
work for very large, powerful, general contractors. Equity dictates
that such financially well-endowed businesses should bear bur-
dens of employee injuries incurred while performing the danger-
ous work.1 1 7 Indeed, gross inequity results if the entire burden of
paying for such injuries and dealing with other losses befalls "with
crushing effect" the unfortunate employee, his dependent family,
or estate, since he generally does not possess financial stability
comparable to that of large general contracting operations. 1 ,
For the foregoing policy reasons, complete abolition of the doc-
trine proves neither desirable nor reasonable. The proper remedy
lies in endeavoring to define the term in such a way that it may be
understood and applied correctly not only by lawyers and judges,
but also by the general contractors, other employers, independent
contractors and employees to which it directly applies. Unfortu-
nately, as the cases have already proven, this is much easier said
than done. The forthcoming analysis of the Hooper interpretation
of the Woodson definition attempts to shed some light on the com-
mon difficulties encountered, and suggests some of the factors
which should be included in a proper application of the doctrine.
116. Id. In other words, the employer would be immune if he could show he
used "due care" in selecting an independent contractor. Without mind probes,
however, there is no way an employer could prove this. Thus, such proof is
impossible, thereby giving the employer no more incentive than he would have
notwithstanding the doctrine.
117. See Vogh v. Geer Co., 171 N.C. 672, 750, 88 S.E. 874, 876 (1916).
118. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Hooper v. Pizzagalli Construction Co. 119 was the first North
Carolina case interpreting the inherently dangerous concept as
defined in Woodson v. Rowland. 20 In Woodson, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court compiled parameters developed in earlier
cases in an attempt to clarify the murky doctrine for application in
the workers' compensation context.' 2 ' The Hooper court based its
decision not to hold the general contractor liable almost entirely
on the "collateral negligence" aspect of the Woodson definition. 122
The court's decision in Hooper reflects the North Carolina trend
toward narrowing the scope of the doctrine, thus reducing the
range of activities which can properly be classified as "inherently
dangerous" for the purpose of imposing vicarious liability for inju-
ries resulting either directly to the employees of independent con-
tractors, or to others as a consequence of work performed by those
independent contractors.
A. The Court's Decision
Unlike the Woodson decision, which held a certain trenching
operation may or may not be inherently dangerous depending on
the circumstances, 123 the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
Hooper quickly affirmed .the trial court's summary judgment
favoring general contractor Pizzagalli, holding that the decedent
was not involved in inherently dangerous work at the time of his
death.124 The Hooper court first stated that plumbing subcontrac-
tor Acme, for whom the decedent worked, was required pursuant
119. 112 N.C. App. 400, 436 S.E.2d 145 (1993), discretionary review denied,
335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
120. See generally Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
121. See generally David L. Lambert, Comment, From Andrews to Woodson
and Beyond: The Development of the Intentional Tort Exception to the Exclusive
Remedy Provision-Rescuing North Carolina Workers from Treacherous Waters,
20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 164, 196 (1992). This commentary sets out the elements for a
full-blown Woodson workers' compensation claim as a practical guide for
attorneys: (1) The worker must be seriously injured or killed; (2) a prior injury or
death has occurred on the same equipment or instrumentality; (3) there has been
some sort of faulty operation (i.e., removal of safety guards); (4) prior warnings
were received by the employer from employees or safety inspectors; and (5) the
employer has continued using the equipment or instrumentality with the defect.
Id.
122. Hooper, 112 N.C. App. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149.
123. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 357, 407 S.E.2d at 238.
124. Hooper, 112 N.C. App. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149.
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to the contract to provide all materials, tools and equipment nec-
essary to complete the work. 125 However, the contract was silent
concerning provisions of a scaffold.'12 The court of appeals stated
the record indicated Pizzagalli retained no supervisory role over
Acme during the course of the job. 127 In analyzing whether the
decedent had died from inherently dangerous work, the Hooper
court defined the doctrine as follows:
[Work to be done from which mischievous consequences will arise
unless certain preventative measures are adopted, and that which
has "a recognizable and substantial danger inherent in the work,
as distinguished from a danger collaterally created by the
independent negligence of the contractor, which later might take
place on a job itself involving no inherent danger."128
Like the court in Woodson, the Hooper court created a hybrid defi-
nition, using those developed in Greer129 and Woodson. 130 The
Hooper court further held that since Pizzagalli hired the dece-
dent's employer for plumbing work only, and since plumbing, by
its nature, does not harbor "substantial or recognizable dangers"
sufficient to meet the above definition, the decedent's estate could
not claim the decedent had been killed while performing inher-
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 405, 436 S.E.2d at 149 (citations omitted) (citing Greer v. Callahan
Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925) and quoting Woodson v. Rowland,
329 N.C. 330, 351, 407 S.E.2d 222, 234 (1991)). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 426 (1965). This section provides:
an employer of an independent contractor, unless he is himself
negligent, is not liable for physical harm caused by any negligence of the
contractor if:
(a) the contractor's negligence consists solely in the improper
manner in which he does the work, and
(b) it creates a risk of such harm which is not inherent in or normal
to the work, and
(c) the employer had no reason to contemplate the contractor's
negligence when the contract was made.
Id.
129. See Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925).
That court defined inherently dangerous work as work "from which mischievous
consequences will arise unless preventive measures are adopted." Id. at 637, 130
S.E.2d at 742.
130. The Hooper court used only parts of the Woodson definition. It did not
meticulously pick through the high court's analysis in order to discern its full
interpretation of the doctrine. Thus, its analysis appears weak in light of
Woodson.
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ently dangerous work.1 31 The decision turned on the court's belief
that the decedent had committed collateral negligence sufficient to
bar his estate's recovery from the general contractor. 132 In sup-
porting its opinion, the court stated simply the decedent negli-
gently failed to secure himself or the scaffold board, thus the
general contractor escaped vicarious liability. 133 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court subsequently denied review of the case.'
34
From the outset, the Hooper court's analysis seems problem-
atic in light of the Woodson analysis. For example, the Hooper
court never addressed the issue of whether Pizzagalli could have
reasonably foreseen that the decedent might use a scaffold during
his work on the building, which was at least seven stories high. 35
131. Hooper, 112 N.C. App. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149. Although the court
admitted no North Carolina case has addressed the issue of whether plumbing is
an inherently dangerous activity, it asserted that other jurisdictions have found
plumbing not to be inherently dangerous. See, e.g., Goolsby v. Kenney, 545
S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
132. Hooper, 112 N.C. App. at 406, 436 S.E.2d at 149.
133. Id.
134. Hooper v. Pizzagalli Constr. Co., 335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965), providing generally
that, one who employs an independent contractor to do work which he should
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though he has provided for such precautions in the contract or
otherwise. See also comments a, d, and e to the above section: Comment a
states that the above rule usually applies to situations where the employer
should anticipate the need for some special precaution, such as painting carried
on upon a scaffold above a highway; Comment d reiterates the normal
characteristics of inherently dangerous activities, namely that they need not be
extra-hazardous, abnormally dangerous, or involve a very high degree of risk; it
is essential only that the risk is one differing from common risks to which persons
ordinarily involved in the type of work are subjected [emphasis added]; Comment
e suggests that it is sufficient that the employer should recognize the risk as
likely to arise in the usual course of the work, or the particular method which the
employer knows the contractor will adopt. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 416 cmts. a, d, and e (1965).
See 41 AM. JuR. 2D Independent Contractors § 43 (1968), which states that
ordinary building activities including both construction and demolition cannot be
considered inherently dangerous. For an early opinion on collateral negligence,
see Cole v. City of Durham, 176 N.C. 289, 97 S.E. 33 (1918). This court stated
the principle of collateral negligence has no application where the injury might
have been anticipated as a direct and probable consequence of the performance of
the work contracted for, even if reasonable care is omitted in the course of its
performance. Id. at 299, 97 S.E. at 38. In such case the general contractor or
other employer of the independent contractor remains liable even though the
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In contrast, the Woodson court considered foreseeability a large
variable in the equation. 13 1 Presumably, the scaffolding was sup-
plied not by Acme but by Pizzagalli, since scaffolding was never
mentioned in the contract. Thus, Pizzagalli should have known
about the scaffold's presence on the site. Therefore, logic dictates
that the general contractor should have foreseen the decedent's
use of the scaffold. Usually, plumbers' work does not require scaf-
folding. Unless it could be proven that Acme Plumbing routinely
engaged in work at great heights, and that its employees were
properly trained to work at such heights, 137 logic dictates that the
general contractor could have foreseen the decedent's negligent
use of the scaffold.138 If, in fact, the scaffolding did belong to Piz-
-negligence is that of an employee of the general contractor. Id. See also infra
note 141 and accompanying text.
136. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 352, 407 S.E.2d at 235. The court quotes the
following from Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 260, 17 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1941):
"The rule imposing liability on one who employs an independent contractor
applies 'whether [the activity] involves an appreciable and foreseeable danger to
the workers employed or to the public generally.'" Woodson, 329 N.C. at 352,
407 S.E.2d at 235.
137. One common custom of "subcontracting" in the construction business,
especially on very large jobs involving large general contractors such as
Pizzagalli, entails the practice of bidding. Essentially, a general contractor asks
a number of potential subcontractors to submit bids before the end of a certain
time period. Once that time period expires, the general contractor selects its
subcontractor on the basis of price and many other factors, such as expertise,
quality, reputation, and fitness for the job. Logically, prudent general
contractors often consider only those subcontractors who have experience with
the particular circumstances the job will involve. Thus, potential subcontractors
usually know, or have reason to know, what dangers a job might entail.
Although the facts of the Hooper case do not expressly stipulate that Acme
was a large plumbing company which routinely performed jobs involving heights,
quite certainly Acme was not "Bob, the friendly plumber." Possibly, Pizzagalli
itself routinely employed Acme (this is another general practice in the
construction business). If this scenario were in fact the case, then Pizzagalli may
not have expected one of Acme's employees to negligently use a scaffold, and such
expectation may have been entirely reasonable, given the general practices in the
business. Thus, even though the court failed to actually analyze the
foreseeability aspect of Woodson, it may have escaped the consequences of such
lack of analysis because of an ordinary business custom. Indeed, this may be one
reason the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review of the case.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 (c) (1965). Subsection (c)
generally provides the employer of an independent contractor may not be held
liable for the negligence of such contractor if the employer had no reason to
contemplate the contractor's negligence when the contract was made. Id. See
also Backhoe Accident-Sovereign Immunity, MAss. LAw. WKLY., Feb. 14, 1994,
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zagalli, and if Pizzagalli knew the decedent might perform work
on the seventh floor of the building, 3 9 then reason suggests that
Pizzagalli could have foreseen the possibility of the decedent's
accident. Furthermore, authorities suggest that any time a per-
son uses a scaffold, there automatically exists a recognizable risk
that the person may fall.140
Turning to the collateral negligence issue, an employer can-
not be held liable for any harm caused by some improper method
used by an employee of the independent contractor, if such
at 5 (discussing case holding that the possibility an employee might perform
work in a negligent fashion does not make the activity inherently dangerous).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 cmts. a and b (1965): Comment a
defines collateral negligence as negligence in the operative detail of the work, as
distinguished from the general plan or method followed or result to be
accomplished. Negligence in operative details is usually not within the
contemplation of an employer at the time the contract was made; Comment b
states that an employer is required to contemplate a contractor's negligence with
respect to all risks inherent in the normal and usual manner of doing the work
under the particular circumstances [emphasis added]. In other words, an
employer may be held liable if the circumstances under which the work is to be
done give him warning of a special reason to take precautions. Id.
See also Keeton et al., supra note 9, at 515, professing that the essence of
collateral negligence is its disassociation from any inherent or contemplated risk
which may be expected to be created by the work [emphasis added]. The authors
cite the following examples of collateral negligence: dropping a board while doing
repair work, and mistakingly crippling a ladder by removing ballast weights. Id.
139. Probably dispositive, given that since Pizzagalli knew the building to be at
least seven stories tall, it must have known plumbing would be necessary on
each floor. This is hardly arguable since Pizzagalli, a very large general
contractor, cannot be considered an amateur in the field. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 413 cmt. f, supra note 7. The comment states that in
determining whether to impose vicarious liability on the employers of
independent contractors, courts should take the extent of the employer's
knowledge and experience in the field into account.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 cmt. c (1965). This section
provides the following general rule:
one who employs an independent contractor to do work involving special
danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be
inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has
reason to contemplate in making the contract, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take
reasonable precautions against such danger.
Id. (emphasis added). But see comment d, which states that the rule in this
section does not apply where the employer may reasonably assume that the
operative details of the work will be carried out by the contractor with proper
care. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 cmt. d (1965).
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employee does so without any direction from his employer. 14 1 It
appears from the facts of Hooper that the decedent and his col-
league were alone when the accident occurred. Apparently, no
supervisor was present. Neither the decedent nor his companion
took measures to secure themselves, the scaffold board, or other-
wise attempt any precautions.142 If these findings of fact were cor-
rect, then the Hooper court correctly held the decedent collaterally
negligent. 143 This, however, should not have ended the court's
analysis. For instance, the Woodson court also stated that any
employer of an independent contractor has a duty to ensure that
the contractor carries out the proper precautions.14 4 If Pizzagalli
owned the scaffold rendered unsafe by its unsecured board, then
Pizzagalli could have been held vicariously responsible simply
through its failure to provide for adequate safety precautions. 145
Furthermore, the Woodson court ignored the finding that
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410 cmt. b (1965). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 cmt. a (1965). Comment a describes
collateral negligence as negligence "in the operative detail of the work, as
distinguished from the general plan or method followed or result to be
accomplished." Id. Negligence in operative details is usually not within the
contemplation of an employer at the time the contract was made. Id. But see
Cole v. City of Durham, 176 N.C. 289, 97 S.E. 33 (1918), which discusses
situations in which the collateral negligence doctrine does not apply. The case
clearly points out that the doctrines of collateral negligence and foreseeability
are closely intertwined. This thereby uncovers another possible flaw in the
Hooper court's analysis because Pizzagalli could have easily foreseen the
decedent's injury as a direct and probable consequence of the work contracted,
such work entailing activity performed at great heights. In Cole, the court held
the collateral negligence doctrine does not apply in such situations. Id.
142. Hooper, 112 N.C. App. at 403, 436 S.E.2d at 147.
143. See generally infra note 183 and accompanying text, discussing what
must be done at the trial level to find contributory (or collateral) negligence in
North Carolina.
144. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 351, 407 S.E.2d at 235. See also Thomas v.
Hammer Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 351, 69 S.E. 275 (1910); Dockery v. World of
Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29 (1965).
145. Had Pizzagalli been reasonably prudent, its supervisors and employees
would have ensured the security of the scaffold board. A general custom in the
construction business dictates that where one company owns an instrumentality
which directly results in the injuries of another company's employees, then the
company owning the instrumentality bears responsibility. See also McHugh,
supra note 73, at 665 n.32. The author quotes other jurisdictions which have
found liability when the employer failed to order safeguards or to correct
improper procedures he knows the contractor is using. See, e.g., Ruehl v.
Lingerwood Rural Tel. Co., 135 N.W. 793 (N.D. 1912); Snow v. Marian Realty
Co., 299 P. 720 (Cal. 1931).
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unknown persons had placed the unsecured scaffold board on the
scaffolding. Suppose those unknown persons had been Pizzagalli's
employees. Would not this have placed some duty on the employ-
ees or their supervisors to ensure that the scaffold board was prop-
erly secured? The trial court should have found facts sufficient to
determine exactly from whom the scaffold board originated. Thus,
the appeals court might properly have remanded the case to the
trial court, holding the decedent's collateral negligence conditional
on these findings.
If, in fact, the scaffolding belonged to Pizzagalli, and if its
employees carelessly placed an unsecured board on such scaffold,
then one may argue that such action at least gave rise to a duty to
warn. Moreover, North Carolina courts generally hold that where
a general contractor knows or should know of any potentially dan-
gerous circumstances, such general contractor has a non-delega-
ble duty to an independent contractor's employees to exercise due
care to see that they are provided with a safe workplace where
proper precautions have been taken against any dangers which
may be incident to the work.'4 6
As if the inherently dangerous doctrine were not already cum-
bersome, the collateral negligence doctrine, alone, often proves
equally troublesome. 147 The doctrine comes into play when an
independent contractor, or an employee of such, performs negli-
gently in an operative detail so detached from the work contracted
that it absolves the employer of vicarious liability. 148 This
abstract definition often results in arbitrary line-drawing by
courts. In the Hooper case, for instance, one may argue persua-
sively that the decedent's negligence was detached from the work
contracted-use of scaffolding was never mentioned in the con-
tract. On the other hand, one may argue just as persuasively that
since the scaffolding was ultimately necessary to complete the
work contracted, the decedent's negligence was not sufficiently
detached to quaify as collateral negligence.
146. Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co., 114 N.C. App. 196, 202, 442 S.E.2d 53, 56.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416, supra note 135. See also
comment a to that section, which provides that the non-delegable duty rule to
provide for the safety of subcontractors' employees usually applies to situations
where the employer should anticipate the need for some special precaution, such
as in painting carried on upon a scaffold above a highway. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 cmt. a (1965).
147. See generally McHugh, supra notes 73 and 110.
148. Id.
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North Carolina courts have long held that insufficient evi-
dence of contributory negligence gives rise to a presumption
against such negligence, 149 and that contributory negligence is a
jury question. 150 Courts generally hold the fact that a person has
been killed in an accident does not give rise to a presumption of
contributory negligence.' 5 ' Thus, a court should take care in
applying the doctrine, and the Hooper court seems to have jumped
to concluding contributory (collateral) negligence without dissect-
ing all the possibilities. Therefore, the Hooper court probably
should have remanded the case to the trial court on the collateral
negligence issue, if that issue formed the true motive behind its
holding.
One part of the Woodson and Hooper definitions of inherently
dangerous work provides that mischievous consequences will
arise if proper safety precautions are neglected. ' 52 Is it not true
that securing a scaffold board and "taking other precautions" qual-
ify as proper safety measures? Thus, could it not be argued that if
these measures were necessary to prevent injury while working on
the scaffold, then such work would involve "mischievous conse-
quences" without these preventive measures? It appears from
this small analysis that the work in which the decedent was
involved could have been considered, at least arguably, inherently
dangerous in nature.' 53 Moreover, the Woodson court emphasized
this duty to warn, and its importance to the overall policy objec-
tives of the doctrine, numerous times in its analysis.15 4 If Pizza-
149. Norton v. North Carolina R.R., 122 N.C. 910, 29 S.E. 886 (1898).
150. Miller v. Scott, 185 N.C. 93, 116 S.E. 86 (1923).
151. Goodson v. Williams, 237 N.C. 291, 74 S.E.2d 762 (1953).
152. See supra text accompanying note 41.
153. This proposition is strengthened by the Woodson court's following
quotation from Thomas v. Hammer Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 351, 69 S.E. 275
(1910):
The liability of the employer rests upon the ground that mischievious
[sic] consequences will arise from the work to be done unless
precautionary measures are adopted, and the duty to see that these
precautionary measures are adopted rests upon the employer, and he
cannot escape liability by entrusting this duty to another as an
"independent contractor" to perform.
Woodson, 329 N.C. at 352, 407 S.E.2d at 235 (emphasis added).
154. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 352, 407 S.E.2d at 235. The court quoted
Dockery v. World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29 (1965)
(holding the party that employs the independent contractor has a continuing
responsibility to ensure that adequate safety precautions are taken, and this
nondelegable duty of safety reflects the policy judgment that certain obligations
28
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galli in fact owed Acme and its employees such a duty to warn or
ensure safety, one can easily argue that the general contractor
breached such duty by failing to secure the scaffold, failing to pro-
vide tethers or other safety devices, or failing to provide a means
through which the scaffold could be secured (if these failures could
be proven at the trial level). The facts indicated nothing about a
posting of any warnings concerning the scaffold. Instead of jump-
ing the gun at the first sign of the decedent's possible collateral
negligence, the Hooper court might have gone through an analysis
more closely paralleling that of Woodson; it could have concluded
the decedent acted reasonably in assuming the scaffold was safe.
Notwithstanding its flawed analysis pursuant to the Woodson
interpretation of the inherently dangerous exception, the Hooper
court probably reached the correct result according to North Caro-
lina law. This may be so because of certain customs in the busi-
ness. 155 Had the court analyzed certain factors of the Woodson
interpretation in more depth, it might have reached a different
result. 156 Since the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review
of the case, however, given that the high court formulated the
Woodson interpretation, something obviously pertinent to the case
but lacking in the facts demonstrated the correctness of the hold-
ing. Correct or not, the Hooper court should have given a more
sophisticated, Woodson-like treatment to the doctrine in this case.
B. Other Jurisdictions Compared: How Would They Hold
Hooper?
Even today, inconsistencies abound. States cannot even
agree over the meaning of the doctrine pertaining to scaffolding
alone. For instance, at least one court has found justification for
imposing vicarious liability on an employer for injuries sustained
are of such importance that employers should not be able to escape liability
merely by hiring others to perform them). Woodson, 329 N.C. at 352, 407 S.E.2d
at 235.
155. See generally supra note 137 and accompanying text for further
illumination on customs of the business.
156. A different outcome would have been improbable, however, since North
Carolina still honors the contributory negligence doctrine, which often leads to
harsh results. See generally infra note 183 and accompanying text. The case
seems devoid of some important facts, however. The appeals court could have
remanded the case to find more facts surrounding the scaffold: who owned the
scaffold; who placed the unsecured board on the apparatus; were there any
tethers, safety belts, or devices which could have been used to secure the board
available on site?
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by an independent contractor's employee who fell from a scaf-
fold. 157 Another court has held a scaffold without guard rails to be
an inherently dangerous instrumentality.' 5  This court would
have concluded that since the scaffolding used by the decedent in
Hooper was devoid of guard rails, such scaffolding would qualify
as an inherently dangerous instrumentality; thus the court would
have held that the decedent had been involved in an inherently
dangerous activity, and would have imposed vicarious liability on
Pizzagalli.
Other courts swing the opposite way, holding no inherent
danger in doing work on a high scaffold. 15 9 Such courts would
most likely quickly conclude the decedent's estate in Hooper could
not hold Pizzagalli vicariously liable under an inherently danger-
ous theory. In one case, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from
a scaffold, after having apparently voiced concerns about the scaf-
folding the previous day. 160 In that case, the court held there was
no peculiar risk or inherent danger in scaffold work in residential
construction. 16 1 If Hooper had been contested in this forum, the
court would have had to address the issue whether the same stan-
dard would apply to commercial construction. 162 According to the
Michigan Court of Appeals, work on scaffolding is not in itself
inherently dangerous. 16 3 Where a defective scaffold board causes
a subcontractor's employee's injuries, the injured employee cannot
157. See Mackey v. Campbell Constr. Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980). This is not the norm of most United States jurisdictions, however. This
court used the "peculiar risk doctrine" adopted by California, which, although
analogous to the "inherently dangerous doctrine" used in most other
jurisdictions, imposes a stricter standard which sometimes forces an employer to
bear the responsibility for even unforeseen conduct by a subcontractor's
employees. Id.
158. See Clark v. Rental Equip. Co., 220 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1974).
159. See Hard v. Hollywood Turf Club, 246 P.2d 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). See
also Tort-Inherently Dangerous Activity, MICH. LAw. WKLY., May 10, 1993, at
18 (discussing a Michigan case holding work at heights is not inherently
dangerous).
160. Downs v. A & H Constr., Ltd., 481 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1992).
161. Id.
162. Most likely, the answer would be no. Common sense dictates that since
commercial construction usually involves buildings of greater size (and thus
work at greater heights) than residential construction, courts might be more
inclined to find scaffold work in commercial construction an inherently
dangerous activity.
163. See Labor-General Contractor Not Liable, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 8,
1993, at 19.
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hold the general contractor vicariously liable.16 The Michigan
court could decide either way in the Hooper case. The decision
would turn on whether an unsecured scaffold board falls within
the meaning of a "defective" or "substandard" scaffold board as
defined by the court.
In another case, where a subcontractor's employee was seri-
ously injured when he fell forty feet after the scaffold board on
which he was working collapsed, the court held the general con-
tractor liable because there existed an inherent danger of which
he was aware, and which he could have prevented through the use
of proper safety procedures. 165 This court would probably have
held Pizzagalli vicariously liable through a foreseeability the-
ory.166  The myriad of inconsistencies surrounding the doctrine
as applied to scaffolding is probably grounded in the simple fact
that courts and other authorities have found it virtually impossi-
ble to generate a good working definition for what constitutes
"inherently dangerous." 167 Frustration with the doctrine has even
led some state legislatures to pass statutes dealing specifically
with scaffolding.168
Many jurisdictions apply rules interpreting the inherently
dangerous doctrine which, although not at odds with the present
North Carolina law, do not exemplify the same effort as did the
Woodson court to create such a narrow, all-encompassing defini-
164. Id.
165. Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1985).
166. If a general contractor knows of the existence of a scaffold, and knows it
has taken no steps to assure the safety (i.e., warnings, security tethers, checks on
the equipment) of subcontractors' employees who may work on such scaffold,
then the general contractor might properly be said to have been aware of possible
danger.
167. See, e.g., KEETON Er AL., supra note 9, at 512. The authors admit the
phrase has never been precisely defined. They state that the risk must be
peculiar, but not necessarily unavoidable. They cite several examples of
activities commonly considered inherently dangerous as a matter of law:
construction of reservoirs; keeping vicious animals; high tension electric wires;
blasting; fireworks; crop dusting; excavations near public highways; clearing
land by fire; and construction or reparation of buildings adjoining highways. Id.
at 513. North Carolina courts, however, specifically enumerate only electrical
wiring as inherently dangerous as a matter of law. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
168. See Mydlarz v. Palmer/Duncan Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 695 (Mont. 1984).
Montana has passed a safety statute which makes certain improper use of
scaffolding negligence per se.
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tion.169 For instance, the Illinois courts state the phrase "inher-
ently dangerous" applies to things "imminently dangerous in
kind," such as explosives and poisonous drugs. 170 If an inherently
dangerous instrumentality is a necessary part of the work, then
the work is inherently dangerous.1 7 ' One Illinois court has held
inherent danger to be the type of danger which "inheres" in an
activity at all times, thereby requiring special precautions to be
taken to prevent injury.172
Other jurisdictions have turned desperately to Black's Law
Dictionary in an attempt to adequately define the vague
phrase.173 One jurisdiction has applied the inherently dangerous
exception to any situation in which there exist latent defects about
which the general contractor knows, and which an independent
contractor could not discover through reasonably careful inspec-
tion.174 Some jurisdictions equate "inherently dangerous activi-
ties" with "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally dangerous" ones.17 5
This interpretation, however, does not seem in keeping with the
present trend in the law and the desire to keep the two doctrines
separate and distinct from cne another. 176
The Huddleston v. Union Rural Electric Ass'n decision
remains one of the few cases in which the court refused to "give
up" on the doctrine, trying to assign a narrow, workable definition
to it. 1 77 Perhaps the court attempted this out of fear of the doc-
169. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991). The court
took great pains to analyze all existing North Carolina law and develop a
definition encompassing all important aspects of the previous interpretations.
170. See Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 139 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 1956).
171. Id. The court's reasoning is circular.
172. See Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co., 155 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App. Ct.
1958). That court's interpretation begs the question: What is the meaning of
inhere?
173. See Reynolds v. Manley, 265 S.W.2d 714 (Ark. 1954).
174. See Begley v. Adaber Realty & Inv. Co., 358 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1962). This
case exemplifies how a Missouri court applied the doctrine (not an attempt to
define it). The court used the same standard all courts use in determining strict
liability on a landowner for injuries suffered by an invitee. Id.
175. See, e.g., Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op, 599 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. Ct.
App.), aff'd, 606 S.W.2d 66. (Ark. 1980). The court stated that inherently
dangerous activities necessarily involve a "grave risk of serious harm." Id. at
406.
176. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 427 cmt. b (1965) and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 520 (1965), supra note 51. See also Woodson
v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991) (stating a distinction must be
drawn on a case-by-case basis).
177. See Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n, 841 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1992).
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trine's abolition, a "remedy" suggested by the dissenting opinion of
the case. 178 Or perhaps the Colorado court simply grew tired of
putting up with so much inconsistency. Whatever the case may
be, the majority in Huddleston stated the following two policy
goals sufficiently justify the doctrine: (1) Employers whose enter-
prises directly benefit from a dangerous activity should bear part
of the responsibility; and (2) the doctrine creates "another layer" of
concern, producing incentives to take measures which reduce the
number of injuries.1 79 In its analysis, the Huddleston court stated
that if a plaintiff could not establish the following elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, then a directed verdict should be
entered against that plaintiff: (1) The activity in question presents
a peculiar danger to others inherent in the activity or circum-
stances under which it is to be performed; (2) such danger is differ-
ent in kind from ordinary risks that commonly confront persons in
the community; (3) the employer knew or should have known of
the dangerous activity or circumstances; and (4) the plaintiff's
injury did not result from any collateral or contributory negligence
on the plaintiff's part.180
If the Huddleston court had heard Hooper v. Pizzagalli Con-
struction Co. ,181 it may have reached a conclusion differing from
that of the North Carolina court. For instance, the Huddleston
court may have found the circumstances under which the dece-
dent's plumbing work was performed qualified as inherently dan-
gerous, because such work took place on the seventh floor of an
unfinished high-rise building. Thus, the decedent's estate might
have satisfied the first element stated above. Furthermore, the
danger created by work at heights is not a danger generally con-
fronted by plumbers, unless it could somehow be stipulated that
the injured plumber was accustomed to such dangerous work.1 82
Therefore, the decedent's estate might have satisfied the second
element stated above. Finally, the fact remains that Pizzagalli
hired Acme to plumb a building which Pizzagalli knew to be at
least seven stories high, and Pizzagalli at least should have
known the existence of a possibly dangerous circumstance, and
provided for a safer workplace. Thus, the decedent's estate might
178. See generally supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
179. See Huddleston, 841 P.2d at 287.
180. Id. at 294.
181. 112 N.C. App. 400, 436 S.E.2d 145 (1993), discretionary review denied,
335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
182. See generally supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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have satisfied the third element stated above. Even given that the
decedent's estate satisfied the first three elements above, there
remains the fourth element concerning collateral negligence.
That the decedent failed to check the security of the scaffold
board, coupled with the fact he wore no safety harness in case of a
fall, might qualify as substantial collateral or contributory negli-
gence on the decedent's part. Although Colorado's opinion on the
collateral negligence issue-just how much collateral negligence
is needed, and what qualifies as collateral negligence-remains
unclear, some courts allow recovery even in cases where injured
workers have been found collaterally negligent. 1 3  If Colorado
had not intended a plaintiff's collateral negligence to at least par-
183. See Tort: Brain Injury, MICH. LAw. WKLY., Nov. 8, 1993, at SiB. This
implies that in states which honor the doctrine of comparative negligence (where
a plaintiff may still recover for injuries he or she receives even though his or her
own negligence was partly to blame) the plaintiff's collateral negligence does not
completely bar his or her recovery. Other states, such as North Carolina, still
honor contributory negligence, through which a plaintiff's collateral negligence
totally bars his or her recovery. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1993) (providing a
party asserting the defense of contributory negligence has the burden of proving
such negligence). This may be one reason why the Hooper decision seems harsh
at first glance.
For general information on the doctrine of contributory negligence, see
KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 451-62. Professors Prosser and Keeton define
contributory negligence as follows:
Conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. Unlike assumption of risk,
the defense does not rest upon the idea that the defendant is relieved of
any duty toward the plaintiff. Rather, although the defendant has
violated his duty, has been negligent, and would otherwise be liable, the
plaintiff is denied recovery because his own conduct disentitles him to
maintain the action.
Id. at 451-52. The authors point out that, unlike comparative negligence,
contributory negligence completely bars a plaintiff's recovery. Id. at 472.
For examples, pertinent to the Hooper case, of how North Carolina courts
have interpreted the contributory negligence doctrine, see the following cases:
Harris v. Bridges, 46 N.C. App. 207, 264 S.E.2d 804, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 556,
270 S.E.2d 107 (1980) (holding plaintiffs must act or fail to act with knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the danger involved in his activity); Goodson v.
Williams, 237 N.C. 291, 74 S.E.2d 762 (1953) (holding the fact that a person was
killed does not presume his contributory negligence); Miller v. Scott, 185 N.C. 93,
116 S.E. 86 (1923) (holding that contributory negligence is a jury question);
Norton v. North Carolina R.R., 122 N.C. 910, 29 S.E. 886 (1898) (holding that
insufficient evidence of contributory negligence gives rise to a presumption
against such negligence).
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tially bar his or her recovery from general contractors in applying
the inherently dangerous doctrine, then it would not have added
the fourth element stated above. Thus, the court probably would
have reached the same, or a similar, result as the North Carolina
court (depending on whether Colorado honors the comparative
negligence doctrine), but its use of an elemental analysis appears
much more thorough, and less subject to inconsistent results.
The foregoing fictitious analysis of Hooper v. Pizzagalli Con-
struction Co. in another jurisdiction brings forth an interesting
point. Neither the Woodson nor Hooper interpretations list ele-
ments for determining whether to impose vicarious liability
through the inherently dangerous exception. 84 The Hooper court
might have held differently had it weighed the policy objectives of
the doctrine, coupled with total satisfaction of three of the four
elements stated above by the decedent's estate, against the possi-
bility that the decedent may have been collaterally negligent.18 5
At least, it may have remanded the decision to the trial court on
the question of collateral negligence alone.186
In short, this type of case could be decided any number of
ways, depending upon the jurisdiction in which it is heard. This
further reinforces a dominant theme throughout this Note: the
inherently dangerous doctrine remains almost hopelessly riddled
with inconsistencies, which not only confuse courts and other
members of the legal profession, but also continue to work ineq-
uity on the parties involved.' 87
184. See generally Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
See also Hooper v. Pizzagalli Constr. Co., 112 N.C. App. 400, 436 S.E.2d 145
(1993).
185. This scenario would be more realistic if North Carolina recognized
comparative negligence.
186. The facts surrounding the incident seem scanty; the jury should be given
the opportunity to judge whether it was Pizzagalli's duty to secure the scaffold
board (or whether the decedent was collaterally negligent in not securing it
himself); the jury should be told whether safety belts, etc. were freely available
on the job site for decedent's use (if so, the jury could properly decide that the
decedent was collaterally negligent in failing to use readily-available safety
devices). See also supra text accompanying note 149.
187. It seems a shame that the particular jurisdiction in which a fatal on-the-
job accident takes place dictates whether a decedent's family is allowed to
recover certain damages from such decedent's ultimate employer, the general
contractor. Conversely, such a scheme is equally unfair to general contractors
who are subject to such liability merely because they operate their businesses
within a certain jurisdiction.
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C. Future Outlook: The Inherently Dangerous Doctrine in North
Carolina-Ramifications of the Hooper Decision
In Woodson v. Rowland,"' the North Carolina Supreme
Court generated a narrowly tailored, possibly workable, definition
of what constitutes an "inherently dangerous activity."1s 9 In
Hooper v. Pizzagalli,90 the first case interpreting the Woodson
definition, the North Carolina Court of Appeals used only part of
the complete Woodson interpretation to quickly dispose of the
issue. The decision was denied discretionary review by the North
Carolina Supreme Court,1 91 indicating a possible trend in North
Carolina law toward finding fewer instances in which an activity
may properly be deemed "inherently dangerous." The obvious pol-
icy, in this author's view, behind this stricter trend is to discour-
age frivolous claims by employees who may know they have been
collaterally negligent, and who simply attempt to dig into the
deepest pockets. This practice not only wastes courts' time, it also
burdens general contractors with numerous lawsuits, and expen-
sive, sometimes even unnecessary, insurance.
In one very recent North Carolina case, the plaintiff was
injured while operating a circular saw on a steep roof on a cold,
windy December day.192 The court determined that even in light
of these extreme circumstances, the work in which the plaintiff
had been engaged did not constitute an inherently dangerous
activity.193 In another recent case, the court cited Hooper in
determining that knowledge with substantial certainty requires
more than just a possibility, or even substantial possibility, of
serious injury or death.'
All these cases, including Hooper, are likely to come under
criticism. Although the goal to narrow the definition of "inher-
ently dangerous" is desirable not only in the sense that it will ease
the jobs of practitioners and courts, but also that it may save the
doctrine from heavy criticism and possible abolition, there exists a
point past which courts should not go if the doctrine is to remain
188. 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
189. See generally supra text accompanying note 97.
190. 112 N.C. App. 400, 436 S.E.2d 145 (1993), discretionary review denied,
335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
191. Hooper v. Pizzagalli Constr. Co., 335 N.C. 770, 442 S.E.2d 516 (1994).
192. Canady v. McLeod, 116 N.C. App. 82, 446 S.E.2d 879 (1994).
193. Id.
194. Powell v. S & G Prestress Co., 114 N.C. App. 319, 325, 442 S.E.2d 143, 147
(1994).
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of any use at all. For instance, when a court attempts to apply the
doctrine literally, it may determine a certain activity not to be
inherently dangerous, when in fact it should be classified as such.
The circumstances in Canady v. McLeod 195 point clearly to an
extremely dangerous combination, yet the court, in applying the
Woodson standard, failed to find an inherently dangerous
activity. 19
6
Perhaps in the future, North Carolina courts will adopt an
elemental approach to the doctrine, such as that used in the Colo-
rado case, Huddleston v. Union Rural Electric Ass'n. 197 This type
of approach effectively solves the vagueness problem while at the
same time keeping all aspects of the doctrine in perspective. 198
This also seems an effective way to simplify convoluted, abstract
interpretations like the ones described in Woodson and Hooper.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine imposing vicarious liability on employers of
independent contractors who hire those contractors to do inher-
ently dangerous work remains fraught with frustrations. Because
of its sheer vagueness and accompanying difficulty in application,
it has come to the attention of courts not only in North Carolina,
but to courts across the nation.
In holding the decedent's activity not inherently dangerous,
Hooper v. Pizzagalli Construction Co. represents the first attempt
of a North Carolina court to interpret the interpretation presented
in Woodson v. Rowland. That the North Carolina Supreme Court
denied discretionary review of the Hooper decision suggests a gen-
eral desire in the state court system to narrow the scope of the
doctrine as far as is possible. However, too much narrowing may
only exacerbate the impracticability of the poorly-understood doc-
trine. Such extreme narrowing also causes courts to find fewer
and fewer instances of inherently dangerous activity, in any cir-
cumstance. This proves detrimental to those people who benefit
most from the doctrine-people like the decedent's estate in
195. 116 N.C. App. 82, 446 S.E.2d 879 (1994).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93. If this does not amount to
inherently dangerous work, what does?
197. See supra text accompanying note 180.
198. Generally, when dealing with something which must be applied or
interpreted on a case-by-case basis such as the inherently dangerous doctrine, an
elemental approach seems easier not only for courts, but for practitioners alike.
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Hooper, who are of modest means, compared to large general con-
tractors who are burdened relatively little by the doctrine.199
The inherently dangerous doctrine has one simple aim: to
force general contractors and other employers to uphold their
duties to warn or otherwise provide for the safety of subcontrac-
tors, their employees, and the public in general. Somewhere, how-
ever, a line must be drawn, if for no other reason than to reduce
the inconsistent findings of courts throughout the nation. Perhaps
the Commission on Uniform State Laws should adopt a "Uniform
Definition for Inherently Dangerous Activities." Perhaps North
Carolina and other states should follow Colorado's example, and
adopt an easier to apply elemental approach.200 Whatever the
solution, something must be done to save the doctrine. Otherwise,
more and more courts will become frustrated with it, and it may
eventually risk abolition. The North Carolina courts, through
Hooper and Woodson, are at least making the effort. At least they
make it clear that "inherently dangerous" does not equal "abnor-
mally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous." That is more than one can
say for many courts in this country. As the law continues to
evolve, however, perhaps North Carolina courts, as well as those
across the nation, will adopt more workable and uniform interpre-
tations of the inherently dangerous doctrine.
Mary Margaret McEachern
199. This proposition is predicated on proper definitions and interpretations of
the doctrine. As mentioned above, employers as well can be hurt by a poorly-
defined doctrine, from which courts reach inconsistent results. This leaves
employers with little idea whether they may be held vicariously liable for a given
activity.
200. This appears the most practical approach.
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